Autonomous agents operating in real-world scenarios frequently encounter uncertainty and make decisions based on incomplete information.

"collapsing" any uncertainty, but when an arm is passive, no observation is made,

The paper introduces a new algorithm for planning in partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDP) based on the idea of aggregate simulation. The algorithm uses product distributions to approximate the belief state and shows how to build a representation graph of an approximate action-value function over belief space.

This paper introduces deep synoptic Monte Carlo planning (DSMCP) for large imperfect information games. The algorithm constructs a belief state with an unweighted particle filter and plans via playouts that start at samples drawn from the belief state.

Test-time reasoning architectures such as those following the Generate-Verify paradigm, where a model iteratively refines or verifies its own generated outputs, prioritise generation and verification but exclude the monitoring processes that determine when and how reasoning should begin. This omission may contribute to the prefix dominance trap, in which models commit early to suboptimal reasoning paths and seldom recover, yielding roughly 20% accuracy loss. We address this architectural gap by proposing the Monitor-Generate-Verify (MGV) framework, a computational translation of Flavell's and Nelson and Narens' metacognitive theories that preserves their psychological detail. MGV extends the Generate-Verify paradigm by adding explicit monitoring that captures metacognitive experiences (from difficulty assessments to confidence judgements) before generation begins and refines future monitoring through verification feedback. Though we present no empirical validation, MGV provides a vocabulary for diagnosing component-level failures in reasoning systems, suggests specific architectural interventions for future designs, and identifies connections to resource-rational analysis that may ground its mechanisms in normative principles.

State resetting is a fundamental but often overlooked capability of simulators. It supports sample-based planning by allowing resets to previously encountered simulation states, and enables calibration of simulators using real data by resetting to states observed in real-system traces. While often taken for granted, state resetting in complex simulators can be nontrivial: when the simulator comes with latent variables (states), state resetting requires sampling from the posterior over the latent state given the observable history, a.k.a. the belief state (Silver and Veness, 2010). While exact sampling is often infeasible, many approximate belief-state samplers can be constructed, raising the question of how to select among them using only sampling access to the simulator. In this paper, we show that this problem reduces to a general conditional distribution-selection task and develop a new algorithm and analysis under sampling-only access. Building on this reduction, the belief-state selection problem admits two different formulations: latent state-based selection, which directly targets the conditional distribution of the latent state, and observation-based selection, which targets the induced distribution over the observation. Interestingly, these formulations differ in how their guarantees interact with the downstream roll-out methods: perhaps surprisingly, observation-based selection may fail under the most natural roll-out method (which we call Single-Reset) but enjoys guarantees under the less conventional alternative (which we call Repeated-Reset). Together with discussion on issues such as distribution shift and the choice of sampling policies, our paper reveals a rich landscape of algorithmic choices, theoretical nuances, and open questions, in this seemingly simple problem.

Building on the Extended Mind (EM) theory and radical enactivism, this article suggests an alternative to representation-based models of the mind. We lay out a novel ABC framework of the translating mind, in which translation is not the manipulation of static interlingual correspondences but an enacted activity, dynamically integrating affective, behavioral, and cognitive (ABC) processes. Drawing on Predictive Processing and (En)Active Inference, we argue that the translator's mind emerges, rather than being merely extended, through loops of brain-body-environment interactions. This non-representational account reframes translation as skillful participation in sociocultural practice, where meaning is co-created in real time through embodied interaction with texts, tools, and contexts.

Here we adopt the hypothesis that when we are in an interactive social setting, our brains perform Bayesian inference of the intentions and cooperativeness of others using probabilistic representations.

What policy should be employed in a Markov decision process with uncertain parameters? Robust optimization's answer to this question is to use rectangular